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1Abstract
During transition, maintaining employment and providing a social safety net to the
unemployed are important to social stability, which in turn is crucial for the productivity
of the whole economy. Because independent institutions for social safety are lacking and
ﬁrms with strong proﬁt incentives have little incentives to promote social stability due
to its public good nature, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are needed to continue their
role in providing social welfare. Charged with the multi-tasks of eﬃcient production
as well as social welfare provision, SOEs continue to be given low proﬁt incentives and
consequently, their ﬁnancial performance continues to be poor.
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Non-Technical Summary:
This paper explains why in almost all transition economies, reforms of State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) have been slow and SOEs continue to have poor financial
performance. We start with the observation that, during transition, a social safety net has
to be established in order to achieve social stability. Otherwise, social instability caused
by mass unemployment would create an undesirable general environment for business
and thereby lower the overall efficiency in the economy. However, at the start of reform,
independent agencies specializing in providing a social safety net are missing because,
before transition, SOEs functioned as the main social welfare providers. It is very
difficult to establish quickly an institution independent of the SOEs to provide the safety
net even if the funding is available. Therefore, during transition, the government chooses
to slow down the SOE reform and to keep a certain number of SOEs in order to maintain
social stability. The remaining SOEs continue to be charged with multiple tasks, i.e., the
task of production and that of social welfare provision.
More specifically, the paper has the following predictions.  First, if the existing level of
social stability is low, the reformist government should maintain a certain proportion of
SOEs during transition, i.e., a complete privatization of SOEs should be delayed. The
rationale is that, by delaying privatization, the multi-tasked SOEs continue to face low
profit incentives and, therefore, have little incentive to divert unobservable effort from
social welfare provision to production. Meanwhile, with profit as their sole objective,
private firms have little incentives to spend resources on social stability due to its public
good nature. Second, as a result of multi-tasking, SOEs' financial performance is
inevitably poor during reform. In particular, the profitability of an SOE is lower than that
of a private firm. This is not only because SOEs have to spend resources on maintaining
social stability but also because they are given low profit incentives by the government.
Third, when the existing level of social stability is higher or the total factor productivity
of an SOE is low relative to that of a private firm, the reformist government should
reduce the proportion of SOEs, i.e., the process of privatization should speed up.2b
The paper extends the general analysis to two important cases. The first is a reformist
government at the beginning of transition that can directly enhance social stability at a
cost, e.g., by using tax revenue collected with a social cost. We show that, when the cost
is very high, the government chooses not to spend sufficient resources itself on social
stability. As a result, SOEs are relied upon to provide needed social stability in transition.
Conversely, when the cost is very low, the government chooses to spend sufficient
resource itself on social stability so that SOEs are not relied upon to maintain stability.
Hence, they are reformed at the beginning of the transition. The other extension is a
consideration of unemployment in the labor market as a source of social instability. All
the main results carry over to the extended models.
After presenting a theory to illustrate the above argument, the paper discusses China's
experience of SOE reform. We argue that the in the Chinese case, indeed social stability
is a major concern of the reformist government.  Because of this concern, the pace of
SOE reform has been slow and SOEs have not been given profit incentives similar to
those faced by private firms.  As a result, profitability of Chinese SOEs has been
decreasing.  Yet, SOEs are forced not to lay off all the workers as they tend to.
There are two policy implications of the paper.  First, A major objective of economic
reform should be to establish an independent social safety net, since this is a foundation
of other reforms.  Second, before an independent social safety net is set up, it is better to
slow down the reform of SOEs so as to induce SOEs to function as organizations of
social stability provision.  Although the performance of SOEs may suffer in the process,
such a strategy improves the overall performance of the economy.1. Introduction
This paper presents a theory to explain why in almost all transition economies, re-
forms of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have been slow and SOEs continue to have
poor ﬁnancial performance. The theory starts with the observation that, during transi-
tion, a social safety net has to be established in order to achieve social stability. Oth-
erwise, social instability caused by mass unemployment would create an undesirable
general environment for business and thereby lower the overall eﬃciency in the econ-
omy. However, at the start of reform, independent agencies specializing in providing a
social safety net are missing because, before transition, SOEs functioned as the main so-
cial welfare providers. It is very diﬃcult to establish quickly an institution independent
of the SOEs to provide the safety net even if the funding is available. Therefore, during
transition, the government chooses to slow down the SOE reform and to keep a certain
number of SOEs in order to maintain social stability. The remaining SOEs continue to
be charged with multiple tasks, i.e., the task of production and that of social welfare
provision.
In Section 2, we use a stylized model to illustrate this theory. There are three groups
of results. First, if the existing level of social stability is low, the reformist government
should maintain a certain proportion of SOEs during transition, i.e., a complete priva-
tization of SOEs should be delayed. The rationale is that, by delaying privatization,
the multi-tasked SOEs continue to face low proﬁt incentives and, therefore, have lit-
tle incentive to divert unobservable eﬀort from social welfare provision to production.
Meanwhile, with proﬁt as their sole objective, private ﬁrms have little incentives to
spend resources on social stability due to its public good nature. Second, as a result of
multi-tasking, SOEs’ ﬁnancial performance is inevitably poor during reform. In partic-
ular, the proﬁtability of an SOE is lower than that of a private ﬁrm. This is not only
because SOEs have to spend resources on maintaining social stability but also because
they are given low proﬁt incentives by the government. Third, when the existing level
of social stability is higher or the total factor productivity of an SOE is low relative to
3that of a private ﬁrm, the reformist government should reduce the proportion of SOEs,
i.e., the process of privatization should speed up.
After illustrating the key insights with a stylized model, we extend our analysis to
two important cases. The ﬁr s ti sar e f o r m i s tg o v e r n m e n ta tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft r a n s i t i o n
that can directly enhance social stability at a cost, e.g., by using tax revenue collected
with a social cost. We show that, when the cost is very high, the government chooses not
to spend suﬃcient resources itself on social stability. As a result, SOEs are relied upon
to provide needed social stability in transition. Conversely, when the cost is very low,
the government chooses to spend suﬃcient resource itself on social stability so that SOEs
are not relied upon to maintain stability. Hence, they are reformed at the beginning
of the transition. The other extension is a consideration of unemployment in the labor
market as a source of social instability. All the main results carry over to the extended
models.2
After the theory sections, empirical evidence from China’s reform experience is pre-
sented in Section 5. We argue that the basic premise and predictions of the theory are
supported by evidence from the experience of China’s state enterprise reform. Although
we feel that the theory is also relevant to other transition economies, future empirical
work is needed to conﬁrm this conjecture.
Our theory of SOE reform is based on a second-best argument. The conclusion that
a certain proportion of SOEs should continue to exist during reform is driven by the
condition that the government cannot ﬁnd other means to provide a social safety net
for unemployed workers. The ﬁrst best solution is achievable if an independent social
security system can be established so that this task can be separated from the SOEs.
Then the government can provide strong proﬁt incentives for SOEs, including possibly
outright privatization and, thereby, improve their performance. The key reason for this
last result is that the poor ﬁnancial performance of the SOEs is not simply a reﬂection
of the direct ﬁnancial resources that the SOEs spend for social security and welfare
purposes. In other words, it is not simply a result of the redistribution of economic
4beneﬁts produced by SOEs. Instead, it reﬂects also the lower overall eﬃciency in SOEs
due to weak proﬁt incentives applied to induce them to carry out the multiple tasks.
However, given that an independent institution to provide the public good does not exist
and can not be established quickly, the second best social optimum is to keep a fraction
of the ﬁrms in the economy state-owned and charge them with the task of producing
the public good.
Our theory is not simply one of government intervention to deal with an externality.
Although the externality is a critical element in our theory, at the center of our work are
the questions of how private incentives aﬀect the private supply of a public good and
how the government should design incentives to achieve the best balance between private
proﬁt incentives and the private supply of public goods.3 To answer these questions, we
derive our results on the optimal speed of privatization.
Several important observations are critical for our theory. The ﬁrst is based on how
social stability is maintained in transition. Unlike most mature market economies, there
are no independent establishments specializing in providing social services and social
safety net in a transition economy. Moreover, in the short run, it is very diﬃcult and
costly, if not impossible, for the government to establish such institutions. Existing
bureaucracies, e.g., ministries of labor, ﬁnance, and civil welfare, may compete to obtain
control rights of the new institution. Also, due to the stretched political capacity of
the reformist government, monitoring such new institutions is diﬃcult. Therefore, SOEs
should continue to play the role of providing such services. A typical SOE in transition
economies was established as a mini-community with all social service facilities, such as
canteen, medical clinic, beauty saloon, theatre, and shuttle buses. It is very costly for
the government to use tax revenue to replace such functions of SOEs.4 Our observation
is that SOEs represent the dominant channel through which social services and the social
safety net are provided in transition.
The second observation is that the eﬀorts of SOE managers to provide social ser-
vices and to maintain social stability are not observable. Although the government can
5instruct an SOE to keep a certain number of workers on its payroll, which indeed has
been the case in reality, it cannot observe directly how well an SOE provides social
services to its employees. Therefore, SOE managers must not face high-powered proﬁt
incentives that induce them to cut costs by not treating surplus workers properly. Sim-
ilarly, a tax on SOEs for laying-oﬀ workers, the so-called unemployment tax, cannot
induce SOE managers to provide social services, since this can at most prevent the SOE
from laying-oﬀ workers. In China, a well known tendency is that SOEs treat surplus or
unproductive workers as second class citizens by depriving them of many beneﬁts, e.g.,
denying them health care beneﬁts and delaying the repair work for the broken windows
of their company-provided apartment. This tendency threatens to stir popular resent-
ment against reform. Based on this observation, our assumption is that an SOE manager
can escape government monitoring and divert eﬀorts from providing social services to
employees to seeking higher proﬁt s .T h i si st h eb a s i so fo u rm u l t i - t a s kt h e o r y .
The third important observation is that obstacles exist in the labor market preventing
it from clearing during transition. Should the labor market clear, the social welfare
problem on which this paper is based would not exist. Then all SOEs can be made single-
task agents. The government’s concern for income distribution and its wage regulation to
address this concern are a plausible reason for labor market imperfection in a transitional
economy (see Gordon and Li, 1999).
Our analysis of the social safety net departs from those in the traditional literature
that emphasize the trade-oﬀ between incentives and insurance for those covered by a
social safety net.5 A social safety net provides insurance to economic agents but takes
away their work incentives at the same time. This concern relates to the principal-agent
relationship between workers and employers. Although the trade-oﬀ is an important
issue, there is another issue that is unique in a transition economy and more urgent. This
issue involves the principal-agent relationship between the state and the SOE managers
and how to provide incentives for SOE managers to continue those social services that
were traditionally supported by SOEs if independent institutions providing a social safety
6net cannot be established quickly enough. Since social stability is a public good, the
eﬃciency of the whole economy is aﬀected. This issue becomes critical to strategies of
SOE reform. In this paper, we focus on the public goods nature of the safety net and
show that this factor slows down SOE reform.6
Our paper is embedded in a lively literature on strategies of economic transition.7
Taking a political economy perspective, Dewatripont and Roland (1992a and 1992b)
argue that, when the reformer has to compensate the losers of reform, a gradualist
reform is likely to be optimal because it can isolate the losers at each stage and minimize
government expenditure. Murrell and Wang (1993) discuss how institutional resource
and structural legacies of a communist economy may lead to a delay in the privatization
process. Qian and Xu (1993) provide insights into the eﬀect of an economy’s pre-reform
organizational structure on the path of reform. Most closely related to our work are
Castanheira and Roland (1996 and 2000), Qian (1996), Li (1997), and Roland and
Verdier (1999). In a dynamic neoclassical Ramsey model of investment, Castanheira
and Roland (1996 and 2000) show that too fast closure of SOEs reduces income and
savings so that less investment can be made in non-SOEs. To explain the slow pace
of SOE reforms, Qian (1996) and Li (1997) argue that the lack of large investors or
institutions for corporate governance require continued government control of SOEs in
order to curb the agency costs associated with excessive insider control. Finally, Roland
and Verdier (1999) argue that high unemployment leads to congestion in the labor
market and excessive search costs for new jobs.
Our paper adds to these existing works by providing a new dimension to the rela-
tionship between SOEs and non-SOEs, i.e., the issue of social stability. We show that
SOE managers should be given low-powered incentives. Theoretically, our model builds
upon Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991, 1994) multi-task theory. Our innovation lies in
emphasizing the diﬀerence in the scope of inﬂuence of the tasks. We introduce into the
multi-task model the possibility that one of the tasks has a public good nature. As a
result, we prove that it is optimal for the government to maintain a mix of SOEs and
7private enterprises, even if these enterprises are assumed to have identical production
function and are managed by ex ante homogeneous agents.
2. Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we set up a highly stylized model to illustrate the main arguments
of the paper. In the model, a reformist government decides on the pace of SOE reform
by choosing a certain proportion of SOEs not to be reformed during the period. There
are three main predictions of this model. First, if the initial level of social stability is
low, the government chooses to keep some SOEs; these are given low proﬁti n c e n t i v e s
and instructed to devote eﬀorts to maintaining social stability. Second, as a result, these
SOEs are less proﬁtable than private ﬁrms. Third, when either the initial level of social
stability is higher or the total factor productivity of SOEs is lower, the government
should choose to keep fewer SOEs, i.e., the government should speed up reform.
To illustrate the key insights, the stylized model assumes a ﬁxed product price and
does not explicitly consider the labor market. However, the main results remain un-
changed quantitatively when these assumptions are dropped.8 As an illustration, in
Section 4, we include the labor market by considering employment as a proxy for social
stability. The extension of the basic model to include the product market competition
can be found in an earlier version of the paper (Bai, Li, Tao and Wang, 1999).9
2.1. The Model
Suppose that there are inﬁnite number of ﬁrms in the economy, populated in the
unit interval I =[ 0 ,1]. The ﬁrms are of the following two types: private ﬁrms, the
owner-managers of which keep all the proﬁt, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the
managers of which are paid ﬁxed wages. We use j to denote a private ﬁrm and i to
denote an SOE. The proportion of SOEs is p ∈ [0,1].
The manager of each ﬁrm performs two tasks: s and g.T a s ks is a speciﬁce ﬀort that
aﬀects only the revenue of the ﬁrm, and g is a general eﬀo r tt h a ti n c r e a s e st h er e v e n u e
8of all ﬁrms of the economy. Here s and g a r ec a l l e dp r o d u c t i o ne ﬀort and stability
maintenance eﬀort, respectively. The total cost of the eﬀorts is born by the manager
and given by:
c = s + g.
We assume that the levels of the two eﬀorts are not veriﬁable and hence can not be
the basis of a contract. However, through direct monitoring of managerial eﬀort, the
government can ensure a level of total eﬀo r to fa tl e a s tT from each manager. Given
the incentive contracts, the managers choose s and g according to their self-interest and
subject to the constraint that:
s + g ≥ T.
We assume that the level of social stability G in the economy is given by:
G =
Z
I
g(k)dk + G0,
where the ﬁrst term is the integral of the function g over the interval I, or the aggregate
of the stability maintenance eﬀorts of all enterprises, and G0 is the initial level of stability
plus the government’s eﬀort in providing social stability. We assume that G0 > 0. In
our main case, we also assume that G0 is largely determined by history and cannot be
changed in the short term.
The revenue of each ﬁrm is assumed to be:
x(k)=λ(k)y[s(k),G]+²(k),
where s(k)i sﬁrm k’s speciﬁce ﬀort, ²(k) is a random variable with mean 0 and variance
σ2, ² is independent across ﬁrms, and λ(k)i st h ec o e ﬃcient of eﬃciency of ﬁrm k.F o ra
private ﬁrm, λ(j) is normalized to be 1. For an SOE, λ(i)=λ with 0 < λ ≤ 1. Thus, λ
is the total factor productivity of SOEs relative to private enterprises and is typically less
than 1, reﬂecting lower eﬃciency of SOEs even when managerial eﬀorts are the same in
the two types of enterprises. The reason for this lies in various institutional constraints
faced by the SOEs. For example, SOEs are subject to more government intervention
9than private enterprises and this lowers their eﬃciency. However, the main results of
this paper do not depend on the assumption that λ < 1.
The speciﬁcation of y assumes that g is a pure public good. Although the essential
point is made most clearly by assuming an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms and the pure public
good nature of g(k), the qualitative features of our main results remain if the economy
has a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms and stability has local eﬀects; see Section 4 for example.
Before proceeding to our analysis, we need to make two assumptions on the produc-
tion function y(.,.). The ﬁrst one is rather standard, i.e.,
Assumption 1: y is increasing and concave in s and G, and the cross partial derivative
ysG > 0.
In order to capture the idea that stability is important for a ﬁrm’s production, we
assume that when G is very small, yG is very large. We also assume that ys(T,G0) >
1, which implies that monitoring is not very eﬀective so that the eﬀort enforced by
monitoring is lower than that induced by proper incentives; see equation (1) below. For
the analysis of the benchmark case, i.e., Proposition 1, we assume further that yG is
small when G is very large. Hence, we have a second assumption:
Assumption 2: limG→0 yG(s,G)=∞ for s>0, limG→∞yG(s,G) = 0, and ys(T,G0) > 1,
where yG and ys are the ﬁrst-order derivatives of y with respect to G and s, respectively.
We assume that managers are risk-neutral to focus on the main reason for the ex-
istence of SOE’s in the model, i.e., SOEs provide public goods, rather than reduce the
risk for agents.10 The owner/manager of a private enterprise keeps all the proﬁto ft h e
ﬁrm and his utility is:
u(j)=y(s(j),G) − (s(j)+g(j)).
The manager of an SOE receives a ﬁxed wage wi and his utility is:
u(i)=wi − (s(i)+g(i)).
10The manager of a private ﬁrm will make no eﬀort to contribute to the public good G
because the marginal cost of providing g(j) is one and the marginal beneﬁti syG(s(j),G)
multiplied by his marginal contribution to G.S i n c e G ≥ G0 > 0, yG(s(j),G) < ∞.
Hence, the marginal beneﬁto fg(j) is very small because its marginal contribution to
G is negligible. It follows immediately that the manager of any private enterprise will
not put in any stability maintenance eﬀort. In addition, for any given level of general
stability, the manager will choose production eﬀort to maximize his proﬁt. Because
ys(T,G0) > 1 by assumption 2, optimal s satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition:
ys(s,G) − 1=0 , (1)
and s = s(G) >T. Assumption 1 implies further that s0(G) > 0. Intuitively, the owner-
manager keeps the proﬁto fh i sﬁrm and thus has an incentive to maximize proﬁt. To
do so, he allocates no eﬀort to stability maintenance and all of his eﬀort to production
because his stability maintenance eﬀort has only a small eﬀect on proﬁt while production
eﬀort has a non-trivial positive eﬀect.
The manager of an SOE is willing to provide any level of public goods g ≤ T because,
with a ﬁxed salary, he expends a total level of T eﬀort and is indiﬀerent to its allocation
between production and stability maintenance. The former is due to the characteristics
of government monitoring while the latter follows because the SOE manager’s payoﬀ
does not depend on the proﬁto fh i sﬁrm and, consequently, on how his eﬀort is allocated
between the two tasks. Therefore, the manager of any SOE is assumed to do what is
requested by the government so long as s(i)+g(i)=T.11
The fundamental reason for the above results is that stability is a public good, which
implies that the eﬀect of a manager’s stability maintenance eﬀort on the proﬁto fh i s
ﬁrm is generally smaller than that of his production eﬀort. So long as the manager’s
payoﬀ depends on the proﬁto fh i sﬁrm, he will not fully take into account the externality
of his stability maintenance eﬀort and will provide too little of it. The government can
mitigate the problem of under-provision of stability maintenance eﬀort only by keeping
some SOEs where the managers are paid ﬁxed wages and monitored. The results of the
11above discussion are summarized in the following lemma.
L e m m a1 :F o rap r i v a t eﬁrm, g = 0 is the optimal choice. For an SOE, the manager is
indiﬀerent to any g in [0,T].
We assume that the objective of the government is to maximize the total social
surplus that equals the unweighted sum of proﬁts of all ﬁrms. The timing of events is
as follows. First, the government chooses the percentage of SOEs in the economy, i.e.,
p, and makes a uniform eﬀort choice, i.e., g, for stability maintenance and T − g for
production, for all managers of SOEs, given that the managers are indiﬀerent to any
eﬀort choices satisfying s + g = T. Second, the owner-managers of private ﬁrms choose
their production eﬀorts, i.e., s.
Recall that equation (1) summarizes how the managers of private ﬁrms choose s in
response to the stability maintenance level G, which is the second stage of the game.
Now, we analyze the ﬁrst stage of the game, i.e., how the government chooses p and g,
which jointly determine G, in order to maximize the total social surplus:
π ≡ p[λy(T − g,G) − T]+( 1− p)[y(s,G) − s],
where λy(T − g,G) − T is the proﬁto fa nS O E ,y(s,G) − s is the proﬁt of a private
enterprise, and G = pg + G0 is the level of social stability.
This section assumes that the owner-managers of private ﬁrms keep all the proﬁts and
the state maximizes the sum of proﬁts of all enterprises. A motivation for this assumption
is that the government is concerned with maintaining political control. Social welfare is
an index of the average happiness of people in the society. Higher social welfare helps
solidify the government’s political control. In fact, these assumptions can be relaxed.
Results similar to those in this section can be shown if we assume that the state taxes
the proﬁt of private enterprises and maximizes its revenue, i.e., the sum of taxes from
private ﬁrms and proﬁts from state-owned ﬁrms.
2.2. The Benchmark Case
12We ﬁrst study a benchmark case in which the government is able to rely on a social
safety net to provide social stability rather than solely on SOEs. Alternatively, the
benchmark case can be thought of as one in which the initial level of social stability,
i.e., G0, is very high so that social unrest is very unlikely. Not surprisingly, the optimal
choice for the government is to have no SOEs, since private enterprises are more eﬃcient.
In other words, the benchmark case highlights the main reason for keeping SOEs, i.e.,
the need to provide public goods.
Proposition 1: When G0 is suﬃciently large, the optimal p =0 .
Proof: The partial derivative of π with respect to p is:
∂π
∂p
=[ λy(T − g,G) − T − y(s,G)+s]+λpgyG(T − g,G)+( 1− p)gyG(s,G). (2)
Notice that λy(T − g,G) − T<y (s,G) − s, since the right-hand-side is the maximal
proﬁto fap r i v a t eﬁrm while the left-hand-side is strictly less than the maximal proﬁt
because the optimal s(G) >T. By Assumption 2, yG(s,G)g o e st o0w h e nG ≥ G0 goes
to ∞. Therefore, the partial derivative of π with respect to p is negative for all p when
G0 is suﬃciently large. Q.E.D.
2.3. The Main Case
For the main case, we assume that G0 is determined by history and it is very costly
for the government to change its level in the short term. Furthermore, the initial level of
G0 is rather low. Then, we show that it is optimal to have some SOEs in the economy.
Proposition 2: When G0 is suﬃciently small, the optimal p>0.
Proof: We ﬁrst prove that the optimal g d o e sn o tg ot oz e r oa sp approaches zero. The
partial derivative of π with respect to g is:
1
p
∂π
∂g
= −λys(T − g,pg + G0)+λpyG(T − g,pg + G0)+( 1− p)yG(s,pg + G0). (3)
13For g ≤ T −δ and δ > 0, the ﬁrst term above is bounded from below by −λys(δ,pg+G0).
Because limG→0 yG(s,G)=∞ when p and G0 are both suﬃciently small, the third
term in equation (3) dominates and ∂π
∂g is positive. That is, for suﬃciently small G0,
limp→0 g ≥ T − δ.
The partial derivative of π with respect to p is given by equation (2). To prove that
the optimal p>0, we need to show that ∂π
∂p is positive for p =0 . W h e np → 0a n d
when G0 is small enough, because limp→0 g ≥ T −δ, Assumption 2 implies that the last
term in equation (2) is very large and dominates other terms. Therefore, the optimal p
is greater than 0. Q.E.D.
The intuition for this result is as follows. When G0 is small, the marginal product of
G is large and it is desirable to increase the level of G beyond G0. Since it is extremely
costly for the government to do, SOEs are used for this purpose.
An equally interesting question is under what conditions the government would
choose to have some private enterprises. The simple condition is that either the ef-
fort level by a SOE manager (T) or the total factor productivity of SOEs (λ)r e l a t i v et o
private enterprises is low. Under either condition, the opportunity cost of keeping a large
proportion of SOEs, which is measured by the extra revenue from private enterprises,
can be higher than the beneﬁt of generating high public goods. To be precise, we have:
Proposition 3: When T or λ is suﬃciently small, the optimal p<1 for all G0.
Proof: When p =1 ,
∂π
∂p
= λ[y(T − g,g + G0)+gyG(T − g,g + G0)] − T − [y(s,g + G0) − s],
which is negative when T or λ is small enough. Therefore the optimal p<1. Q.E.D.
The next proposition indicates that an SOE is less proﬁtable than a private ﬁrm.
This result highlights the idea that SOEs are maintained to promote social stability
despite their low proﬁtability.
Proposition 4: For any p and G0, an SOE produces less proﬁt than a private ﬁrm.
14Proof: A private ﬁrm’s proﬁti s :
y(s,G) − s,
where s is chosen to maximize the proﬁt. An SOE’s proﬁti s :
y(T − g,G) − T<y (T,G) − T<y (s,G) − s. Q.E.D.
We note that the basis for Proposition 4 is not the low total factor productivity, i.e.,
λ, of an SOE relative to a private ﬁrm. Even if λ = 1, Proposition 4 still holds. Two
factors are responsible for low proﬁtability of an SOE. First, private ﬁrms free ride on
SOEs for G because g>0i na nS O Eb u tg = 0 in a private ﬁrm. Second, SOEs have
lower proﬁt incentives and therefore have a lower eﬀort level, i.e., T<s . In other words,
the poor ﬁnancial performance of SOEs is endogenous.
2.4. Comparative Statics
We examine the eﬀect of changes of λ and G0 on the optimal choice of p and g.I n t u -
itively, when λ, the relative total factor productivity of SOEs, is higher, the opportunity
cost of keeping SOEs is lower so that we expect to see a larger proportion of SOEs.
On the contrary, when G0, the level of non-SOE provided public goods, is higher, the
beneﬁt of keeping SOEs is lower and we expect to see less SOEs at the optimum. These
intuitive predictions are veriﬁed formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 5: Suppose ys(s,G) < ∞.I fλ and G0 are suﬃciently small, the optimal p
has the following properties:
1)
∂p
∂λ > 0; 2)
∂p
∂G0 < 0.
Proof: We ﬁrst show that the optimal p d o e sn o tg ot o1a sλ goes to zero. For p ≥ 1−δ
and δ > 0, because yGG < 0, the last term in equation (2) is:
(1 − p)gyG(s,G) ≤ δgyG(s,pg) ≤ δgyG(s,(1 − δ)g).
For suﬃciently small λ, the right hand side of the above inequality and, thus, the last
term of equation (2) are less than T. For all p ≥ 1 − δ, equation (2) is negative if λ is
15suﬃciently small because y(s,G)−s>0. Therefore, the optimal p is less than 1−δ for
small λ.
Next, we show that, when λ and G0 are suﬃciently small, the optimal g = T.S i n c e
p<1−δ and ys is bounded from above, when λ and G0 are suﬃciently small, the third
term of the right hand side of equation (3) dominates so that ∂π/∂g is positive for all
g. Therefore, the optimal g = T.
¿From Propositions 2 and 3, equation (2) holds at the optimal p.S i n c e g = T is
a constant, the optimal p is determined by equation (2) only. Checking the Milgrom-
Wilson condition, we have:
∂2π
∂p∂λ
= y(T − g,G)+pgyG(T − g,G) > 0. (4)
Therefore,
∂p
∂λ > 0.
∂2π
∂p∂G0
= λyG(T − g,G) − yG(s,G)+λpgyGG(T − g,G)+( 1− p)gyGG(s,G), (5)
where, the last two terms are negative by assumption; λyG(T − g,G) − yG(s,G) < 0
because ysG > 0. Therefore, ∂2π
∂p∂G0 < 0. This implies that,
∂p
∂G0 < 0. Q.E.D.
3. Government Provision of G
Our analysis has assumed a ﬁxed level of G0. In this section, we extend the model by
endogenizing the government’s choice of G0. We show that, if the cost to the government
for providing G directly is high, as it might be in the initial stages of transition, the
government will not provide suﬃcient G and, as a result, SOEs are maintained to provide
G. However, if the cost to the government for providing G is suﬃciently low, it is eﬃcient
for the government to be the only provider of G and SOEs are not needed.
Denote G0 = G1 + G2 where G1 is the initial level of stability and G2 is the govern-
ment’s eﬀort to augment stability. Assume that the cost of government eﬀort is µφ(G2),
where φ is a strictly increasing and convex function. Incorporating the government’s
choice of G2 into consideration, the optimization problem becomes:
16max
p,g,G2
ω ≡ p[λy(T − g,G) − T]+( 1− p)[y(s,G) − s] − µφ(G2)
s.t. G = G1 + G2 + pg
s =a r g m a x [ y(s,G) − s]
The following proposition characterizes the optimal solution:
Proposition 6: Suppose G1 is positive but suﬃciently small. (1) If µ is suﬃciently large,
the optimal p>0. (2) If µ is suﬃciently small, the optimal p =0 .
Proof: The government’s maximization problem can be divided into two steps. In step
1, for a given value of G2, choose (p,g) optimally subject to the constraints. Denote the
maximum value by ω(G2)=π(G2) − µφ(G2) .B yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m ,w eh a v e :
π
0(G2)=pλyG(T − g,G)+( 1− p)yG(s,G).
In step 2, choose G2 to maximize ω(G2).
By Proposition 1, there exists a G0
2 such that the optimal p =0i fG2 >G 0
2.L e t
B1 > 0 be the minimum value of π0(G2)o v e rt h ec l o s e di n t e r v a l[ 0 ,G 0
2]. If µ is suﬃciently
small so that µφ0(G0
2) <B 1, ω0(G2) > 0f o rG2 ≤ G0
2, which implies that the government
should choose G2 >G 0
2. Given such a choice of G2,t h eo p t i m a lp =0 .T h u s ,w eh a v e
proven part (2) of the proposition.
For G2 >G 0
2,t h eo p t i m a lp =0 .T h e nπ(G2)=m a x [ y(s,G)−s], which can be easily
shown to be concave in G2 because y is assumed to be concave in (s,G). Consequently,
π0(G2) decreases for G2 >G 0
2 and, therefore, the maximum value of π0(G2)o v e rt h e
interval [0,∞) is the same as that over the closed interval [0,G 0
2]. Because G1 > 0,
π0(G2) is continuous over the closed interval [0,G 0
2] and, therefore, has a ﬁnite maximum
value over the interval. Denote the maximum value by B2.
By Proposition 2, there exists a G00
2 such that the optimal p>0i fG2 <G 00
2.I fµ is
suﬃciently large so that µφ0(G00
2) >B 2, ω0(G2) < 0f o ra l lG2 ≥ G00
2, which implies that
17the government’s optimal choice of G2 is less than G00
2. Given such a choice of G2,t h e
optimal p>0, which proves part (1) of the proposition. Q.E.D.
The above analysis shows that, if it is possible for the government to enhance directly
social stability at the beginning of transition by expending tax revenue, the government
m a yo rm a yn o tc h o o s et oe x p e n das u ﬃcient amount of resources on maintaining sta-
bility. When the government’s cost of providing this public good is very high, it is not
worthwhile for the government to do so even if it has enough tax revenue. As a result,
SOEs are kept unreformed to provide social stability. Only when the government’s cost
of providing the public good is low enough will SOEs be reformed and social stability
be maintained from tax revenue only.
4. Employment as a Public Good
In the model analyzed in Section 2, g is the eﬀort of a ﬁrm that increases the revenue
of all ﬁrms in the economy and called the stability maintenance eﬀort. We gave several
examples of this eﬀort including employment. When severe unemployment threatens
social stability, increasing employment helps to maintain social stability and, therefore,
has a positive eﬀect on all ﬁrms in the economy. In this section, we consider a variation
of this model to reﬂect better this interpretation of g. For simplicity, we abstract from
any direct government provision of G.
Assume that the revenue of each ﬁrm is:
x(k)=y[s(k),l(k),G] − l(k)w + ²(k),
where l(k)i st h el a b o ri n p u to ft h eﬁrm, w is the market wage, G =
R
k l(k)dk is the
total level of employment in the economy, and all other variables are the same as those
in the previous model. The function y is assumed concave in (s,l,G)a n ds,l,G are
pair-wise complementary. The economy we consider is one with signiﬁcant excess labor
supply. The wage does not clear the labor market and is not aﬀected signiﬁcantly by
labor demand. Therefore, we assume that the wage w does not depend on G.
18In the basic model, a ﬁrm’s eﬀort g has the same eﬀect on its own revenue as it does
on other ﬁrms’ revenue. In contrast, under the current setup, a ﬁrm’s labor input l has
a stronger eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s own revenue than on other ﬁrms’ revenue; that is, l has a
positive local eﬀect. This diﬀerence between the previous model and the current model
makes the analysis suﬃciently diﬀerent to warrant separate treatment.
The manager of an SOE is paid a ﬁxed wage and the wage for employees does not
aﬀect the manager’s payoﬀ. Therefore, the manager chooses s = T and is indiﬀerent
about the choice of l(k). Then, the manager will choose the labor input following the
government’s instruction. Denote the level of labor input that the government instructs
the manager to choose by L.
The owner/manager of a private ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt. We assume that the govern-
ment cannot subsidize employment in private ﬁrms or force these ﬁrms to keep a certain
level of employment. If the government did subsidize employment or had an employment
quota, the ﬁrms would have incentives to create false employment to get the subsidy or
to fulﬁll the quota. Furthermore, rules against ﬁring of workers do not work because the
ﬁr mc o u l dm a k ea nu n w a n t e dw o r k e r ’ sl i f ei nt h eﬁrm so unpleasant that he would quit
instead of waiting for the ﬁrm to ﬁre him. Given this assumption, the labor input l(j)
and the eﬀort level s(j) are chosen by the owner/manager to maximize:
y[s(j),l(j),G] − s(j) − wl(j),
where G = pL+(1−p)le and le is manager j’s expectation of other private ﬁrms’ labor
input. The equilibrium conditions are:
ys[s,l,pL +( 1− p)l
e]=1
yl[s,l,pL +( 1− p)l
e]=w (6)
l = l
e.
Denote the solution by s(p,L)a n dl(p,L). From equilibrium conditions (6), when p =0 ,
s(0,L)a n dl(0,L)d on o td e p e n do nL.D e n o t es(0,L)b ys0 and l(0,L)b yl0.I nt h i s
case, G0 = l0.12
19The government chooses p and L to maximize total social welfare:
π = p[y(T,L,G) − T − wL]+( 1− p)[y(s(p,L),l(p,L),G) − wl(p,L) − s(p,L)],
where G = pL+(1−p)l(p,L). For simplicity, we have assumed implicitly that the only
social beneﬁt of employment is through the production function. In reality, there are
other direct beneﬁts, especially when the labor market does not clear so that there is
unemployment. We omit these direct beneﬁts to focus on our main point. When these
direct eﬀects are included, there will be a stronger case for our main result that it is
optimal to retain some SOEs under certain conditions. Speciﬁcally, our main results can
be stated as:
Proposition 7: The optimal p is positive provided that yG(s0,l 0,G 0)i ss u ﬃciently large.
In this case, SOEs employ more workers and generate less proﬁts than private ﬁrms.
Proof: To facilitate exposition, we ﬁrst introduce the notation that:
V (G) ≡ max
s,l
y(s,l,G) − s − wl,
which is an increasing function of G, because the Envelope Theorem implies that V 0(G)=
yG(s,l,G) > 0. With this notation, the total social surplus when there are no SOEs is:
π(0) = V (G0),
and the total social surplus when p>0a n dL = l0 + l1 for some l1 > 0i s :
π(L,p)=p[y(T,L,G) − T − wL]+( 1− p)V (G),
where G = pL +( 1− p)l(p,l0 + l1). Due to the complementarity between s,l, and
G, it can be shown straightforwardly that l(p,l0 + l1) ≥ l0 for any positive p and l1,
provided that the solution to equilibrium conditions (6) is unique and stable. Then,
20G ≥ pL +(1− p)l0 = G0 + pl1 . Take the diﬀerence between π(L,p)a n dπ(0), we have:
π(L,p) − π(0)
= p[y(T,L,G) − T − wL − V (G0)] + (1 − p)[V (G) − V (G0)]
≥ p[y(T,L,G0) − T − wL − V (G0)] + (1 − p)[V (G0 + pl1) − V (G0)]
= p[y(T,L,G0) − T − wL − V (G0)] + (1 − p)V 0(G2)pl1,
where the inequality results from G ≥ G0 + pl1 >G 0 and the fact that y and V
increase with G. The last equality is a result of applying the Mean Value Theorem,
with G2 being some number between G0 and G0 + pl1.B y t h e E n v e l o p e T h e o r e m ,
V 0(G2)=yG(s2,l 2,G 2), where s2 and l2 are the optimal choice by the owner/manager
of the private ﬁrm for the given G2. Suppose yG(s0,l 0,G 0)i ss u ﬃciently large so that:
yG(s0,l 0,G 0) >l
−1
1 [V (G0)+T + w(l0 + l1) − y(T,l0 + l1,G 0)]
for some positive l1.B e c a u s e 0 <G 2 − G0 <p l 1 and (s2(G2),l 2(G2)) are continuous
in G2, for suﬃciently small p,(s2,l 2,G 2)i sv e r yc l o s et o( s0,l 0,G 0). Consequently, (1 −
p)yG(s2,l 2,G 2)i sv e r yc l o s et oyG(s0,l 0,G 0)s ot h a t :
(1 − p)yG(s2,l 2,G 2) >l
−1
1 [V (G0)+T + wL − y(T,L,G0)].
Then,
π(L,p) − π(0) > 0.
Therefore, the optimal proportion of SOEs, p, is positive.
The proﬁt produced by an SOE is π1 = y(T,L,G)−T −wL and that produced by a
private ﬁrm is π2 = V (G)=V [pL+(1−p)l(p,L)]. Since π2 is the value of y(s,l,G)−s−w
when s and g are optimally chosen while π1 is the value of the same function when s and
g are suboptimal, π2 > π1. The derivative of the total social surplus, π, with respect to
p is:
∂π
∂p
= π1 − π2 +[ pyG(T,L,G)+V
0(G)]
∂G
∂p
.
21Because the optimal p is positive, ∂π
∂p ≥ 0a tt h eo p t i m u m . T h e n∂G
∂p > 0a tt h e
optimum; that is, total employment increases with the proportion of SOEs. This can
only happen when L>l (p,L), or in other words, when each SOE employs more workers
than each private ﬁrm. Q.E.D.
5. Empirical Evidence
Since our research is motivated by China’s experience of state enterprise reform, our
empirical evidence comes from China. Future empirical research on other transition
economies is needed in order to conﬁrm the more general relevance of our theoretical
analysis. Some of the evidence presented below justiﬁes the assumptions of our analysis,
i.e., social stability is important to economic growth and it is a public good. Other
evidence validates the main prediction of the model, that is, the reformist government
made a conscious choice of slowing down SOE reform and instructed SOEs to continue
contributing to social stability, which led to the poor performance of SOEs during the
transition.
The premise of our theory is that social stability is intrinsically important for eco-
nomic growth and that, during reform, there are threats to social stability. Investors,
especially foreign investors, tend to be very sensitive to social stability. In surveys,
Western investors in emerging market economies often list social stability as the leading
factor aﬀecting their choice of investment location. Among the threats to social stabil-
ity in transition economies, massive unemployment is one of the most prominent. In
the Chinese context, the unemployment problem is particularly acute. As labor market
mobility improved during the reform, approximately 100 million Chinese peasants left
their rural residence to search for jobs in cities. Meanwhile, eﬀorts to improve SOEs’
eﬃciency led invariably to large layoﬀs, not only because SOEs have had large amounts
of surplus workers traditionally but also because many SOEs were making unwanted
products and should be liquidated. Some studies estimate that 20 to 30 percent of the
total labor supply in China’s SOEs is redundant (Wang, 1996).
22China’s reformist leaders understand the importance of maintaining social stability
for the success of reform. Speciﬁcally, they have made it very clear that they do not
see mass layoﬀs as an appropriate solution to the surplus labor problem in SOEs. In
an important speech on SOE reform in 1997, then vice Premier (and now Premier) Zhu
Rongji stressed that excessive workers in SOEs should not be resolved through massive
layoﬀs. Also cases of bankruptcy of SOEs should be dealt with more aggressively by
using mergers to minimize the social impact of unemployment that bankruptcy will
cause. Zhu Rongji also instructed the state banks to reduce interest payments for those
SOEs searching for new ways to re-employ their excessive labor. Vice Premier Wu
Bangguo, who is in charge of SOE reform, proclaimed that the government should take
it as an extremely important responsibility that workers under furlough from ﬁnancially
distressed SOEs are re-employed and their basic livelihood is guaranteed (Wu, 1997).
However, unlike the case of developed market economies in which designated govern-
ment agencies provide social welfare services, it was the SOEs that had been the main
providers of most social welfare programs before reform. During reform, they continue
to play the same role. “Many Chinese state enterprises have long operated as social-
welfare institutions, with canteens, hospitals and schools all operating on one budget.”
(Asian Wall Street Journal or AWSJ, July 13, 1998, p. 3.) Establishing separate gov-
ernment agencies to provide a social safety net can not be accomplished overnight. As
early as 1990, when the Chinese government was drafting the eighth ﬁve-year plan, it
emphasized the importance of establishing a social security system. Towards the end of
the decade, an AWSJ article commented that “Beijing has yet to roll out a nationwide
pension system, leaving many workers laid oﬀ without adequate medical and housing
beneﬁts.” (AWSJ, August 6, 1998, p. 5.) In a front-page editorial, the People’s Daily
said, ...[t]he speedy liquidation of state enterprises has generated more layoﬀs than the
government re-employment programs can handle, ...‘In some areas, this has led to serious
social problems.’ (Quoted in AWSJ, August 6, 1998, p. 5.)
Our theory predicts that private enterprises do not have any incentives to employ
23surplus labor to help maintain social stability and this is indeed the case in China. As
noted in a report by China’s State Economic and Trade Commission, local governments
had overemphasized selling SOEs as a tool of reform. The practice has exerted negative
impact on local economic development and social stability because “the ﬁrst thing private
owners typically do to turn around unproﬁtable enterprises is to cut loose their bloated
work-forces.” (AWSJ, July 13, 1998, p. 3.) As can be anticipated, “[m]ounting layoﬀs
have resulted in scattered labor protests throughout the country.” (AWSJ, August 6,
1998, p. 5.)
A main prediction of the theory is that SOEs are instructed to retain employment
so as to help maintain social stability and, as a result, the performance of SOEs suﬀer.
In a survey of 769 Chinese SOEs in 1990, managers were asked why they continue
to produce products that lose money. More than 60 percent of those managers who
responded listed direct employment considerations for workers as “important” and “very
important” reasons (see Table 1). The other reasons for overproduction, “forced by the
government” and “getting subsidies from the government”, are also employment-related.
To provide employment, many Chinese SOEs continue to produce apparently obsolete,
un-competitive and money-losing products. Over 30 percent of state enterprises are
making ﬁnancial loss and relying on government subsidies (Bai and Wang, 1998).
(Insert Table 1 Here)
A rather creative way for Chinese SOEs to help maintain social stability while un-
dergoing restructuring is called xia gang. For cases in which paying workers for doing
nothing is more beneﬁcial than continuing to keep them in productive service, workers
are paid an amount for living expenses by the SOE to “step down from their post” (xia
gang). A worker in xia gang status still enjoys all the standard welfare provisions of
the SOE. In 1996, workers in the SOEs in xia gang status reached nine million, which
accounts for roughly ﬁfteen percent of total employment in SOEs. The meager living
expense paid to xia gang workers is only a small fraction of the cost to support these
24worker because of the high beneﬁts that they receive, such as heavily subsidized com-
pany housing and full or almost complete medical coverage. In a typical Chinese SOE,
the ratio of welfare-provision-assets, e.g., company housing, company-run child-care and
schools, and sports facilities, to total-assets reaches 35 to 40 percent. Welfare beneﬁts
in monetary forms reach more than 50 percent of the total wage bill (see Liu, 1995).
Overall, with various measures taken by the government during the reform era, Chi-
nese SOEs have not only avoided major layoﬀs but also increased total employment until
very recently. As the ﬁgures in Table 2 show, total employment in the SOEs increased by
more than 25 percent between 1980 and 1992 and stayed stable between 1992 and 1997.
In recent years, despite the signiﬁcant slow down of SOE output growth, the total em-
ployment of SOEs has not decreased much. The SOEs have made a major contribution
to keeping surplus labor in the economy and oﬀ the streets.
(Insert Table 2 Here)
The comparative statics in Proposition 5 predict a positive correlation between the
existing level of social instability and the speed of privatization but a negative relation-
ship between the relative eﬃciency of the SOEs and the speed of privatization. This
is consistent with recent observations of the development of privatization in China.13
¿From 1993 through 1997, the Chinese economy experienced a period of declining inﬂa-
tion rates and high real growth. During this time, SOEs became increasingly ineﬃcient
(Bai and Wang, 1998). In September 1997, the Fifteenth Party Congress called for
speeding up the reforms of SOEs. However, the adverse impact of Asian ﬁnancial crises
threatened China’s export markets and deﬂation replaced inﬂation in domestic and for-
eign markets. Economic growth slowed and the pressure of unemployment and therefore
social instability mounted. Not surprisingly, the government took measures to slow down
privatization of the SOEs. (AWSJ, July 13, 1998, p. 3.)
6. Concluding Remarks
25This paper presents a multi-task theory of state enterprise reform. SOEs are charged
with not only the task of eﬃcient production but also the task of social welfare provision.
The theory starts with the observation that, during transition, maintaining employment
or providing a social safety net to the unemployed are important to social stability, which
in turn is crucial for the productivity of the whole economy. However, independent
institutions for a social safety net are lacking and ﬁrms with strong proﬁti n c e n t i v e s
have little incentive to promote social stability due to its public good nature. Therefore,
it is inevitable that SOEs continue to play their multi-task role during the transition.
Accompanying the multi-task objectives of SOEs, low-powered incentives continue to be
imposed on the SOEs so that SOE restructuring is delayed.
The multi-task theory has two simple implications. First, it implies that the SOE
reform and the economic performance of the SOEs cannot be satisfactory unless their
social welfare task is taken over by independent social welfare institutions.14 Second,
the desirable pace of SOE reform has to take into account the speed of emergence of
supporting institutions, in particular, those replacing the functions of the SOEs that are
unrelated to eﬃcient production.15
26Table 1: Reasons for Producing Money-Losing Products.
(Unit: Percentage of Responses by Enterprise Directors.)
Not Impt Important Very Impt Score Ranking
(Unit: Percentage of Responses by Enterprise Directors.)
___________________________________________________________________
‘‘Forced’’ 31.3 23.5 24.8 1.53 0.692
‘‘Lack of Tech.’’ 36.0 33.1 12.7 1.40 0.627
‘‘Subsidy’’ 40.4 19.8 11.9 1.16 0.600
‘‘Employment’’ 20.8 31.8 30.4 1.76 0.675
___________________________________________________________________
Weight 1 2 3
Notes: The table is based on answers to the survey question: “Why Do You Produce
Money-Losing Products?” The survey was conducted with 769 SOEs from 1980 to 1989.
See Li (1997) for details. The complete description of the choices are: “Forced” = “forced
by the government”; “Lack of Tech.” = “lack of technology”; “Subsidy” = “according to
current government policies, we beneﬁt from producing these products”; “Employment”
= “in order to provide jobs for surplus workers.” Enterprises directors were asked to
evaluate each choice (“Forced”, ...) by using a mark, such as: “Not important” ... The
score is deﬁned as each choice’s weighted average mark across all enterprises, with the
reported weight in the table. The ranking is the frequency with which an enterprise
director chose this option as the highest mark among all choices although ties were
possible.
27Table 2: Total Employment of China’s State Sector
(Unit: Million)
______________________________________________________________________
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Employment 80.19 83.72 86.30 87.71 86.37 89.90 93.33
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Employment 96.54 99.84 101.08 103.46 106.64 108.89 109.20
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997
Employment 108.90 109.55 109.49 107.66
______________________________________________________________________
Note: The source is China Statistic Year Book 1995 and China Statistic Year Book 1998.
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Endnotes
1. This is a revised version of our earlier working paper titled ``State Enterprises in
Transition: A Multi-Task Perspective.'' We thank John Bonin, two anonymous
referees, participants of the William Davidson Institute's 1997 Workshop and 1997
AEA Meetings for their many helpful comments. We would also like to thank Roger
Gordon, Yingyi Qian, Gerard Roland, Jan Svejnar, and Chenggang Xu for earlier
discussions on the topic. Partial financial supports from the URC research grant of
HKU (Chong-En Bai), DAG99/00/BM24 and the Chinese SOE project of the HLCOR
of the HKUST (David Li), the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (Zhigang
Tao), and the Graduate School's Grant-in-Aid, University of Minnesota (Yijiang
Wang) are gratefully acknowledged.}
2. An extension to incorporate product market competition can also be made. For
details please see an earlier version of this paper (Bai, Li, Tao and Wang, 1999).
3. Bai and Tao (2000) take a similar perspective to explain the co-existence of
headquarters owned and independently owned branches in franchising. Their model
pays close attention to the context of franchising and is very different from the one in
this paper.
4. In the context of dealing with the problem of social instability associated with
unemployment, it is often suggested that a payroll-type tax be levied so that the
employed pay taxes to be used to subsidize the unemployed as an insurance device.
Such a scheme can not substitute for the role of SOEs because without the social
services of SOEs, it is very costly to compensate an unemployed worker. Given the
high cost, we show that the government is likely not to rely on such taxes in Section
3. Furthermore, with the incidence of the tax born partly by the enterprise, this
actually induces more unemployment and is counter-productive. Hence, despite such
insurance schemes, reforms of SOEs are still slow in reality.
5. We acknowledge an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.33
6. In other words, we discuss the incentives of the providers rather than the recipients
of social welfare.
7. Two excellent surveys on transition are Dewatripont and Roland (1997) and
McMillan (1997).
8. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the extension.
9. In that paper, we incorporate the interaction between the SOEs and private
enterprises via product market competition. The introduction of private enterprises in
transition economies increases product market competition and thereby affects
adversely the performance of state-owned enterprises. The ensuing question is
whether the government should keep any state-owned enterprise in these
circumstances. Presumably, the provision of social stability by the SOEs enhances the
incentive for effort of private enterprises due to the complementarity between social
stability effort and production effort. Meanwhile, due to product market competition,
the financial performance of the SOEs deteriorates. We show that, under reasonable
conditions, the former dominates the latter and, hence, it is optimal to keep some
SOEs in transition economies.
10. We do not assume that the workers are risk-neutral. In fact, we assume implicitly
that they are risk averse and care about the social safety net. We assume only that
managers are risk-neutral. Our results remain valid even if the managers are risk
averse. The proof is available upon request.
11. Notice that T is the effort level that is exerted by managers without incentive
contracts. Therefore, it is not as high as those of the managers of private enterprises
who face high-powered incentives.
12. The notation G0 here has a slightly different meaning from that in Section 2. In
both places, G0 is the level of stability when p=0 but here it is not the initial level of
stability as defined in Section 2.34
13, Another interesting episode was the early 1980's, tens of millions of urban high
school graduates, who were sent to the country-side during the Cultural Revolution,
returned to the cities waiting for urban employment. The mounting potential for social
instability prevented any major SOE reform from being implemented. Indeed, large-
scale SOE reform started only after the mid-1980's when this social stability issue
subdued.
14. This view predicts poor economic performance of SOEs during reform, contrary
to what Jefferson and Rawski (1994) have argued. For the debate on China's SOE
reform, see Woo et al (1993), Woo et al (1994), and Bai, Li, and Wang (1997).
15. See Kornai (1992) for a philosophical discussion of this view. Murrell and Wang
(1993) provide a general analysis.THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
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